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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we analyse the relationship between the Spanish business cycle and the 
capital buffers held by Spanish commercial and savings banks. We build an incomplete 
panel of Spanish institutions from 1986 to 2000 –thus covering a complete business cycle– 
and estimate an equation for the behaviour of capital buffers that includes an indicator of 
the business cycle. Our findings are fairly robust and quite unequivocal. After controlling for 
other potential determinants of the surplus capital we find a robustly significant negative 
relationship between the business cycle and capital buffers. From a quantitative standpoint, 
an increase of 1 percentage point in GDP growth might reduce capital buffers by 17%. This 
relationship is, moreover, asymmetric, being closer during upturns. Accordingly, there is a 
case for taking into account the so-called pro-cyclicality problem in the final design of Basel 
II. Pillar 2 seems to be the right place to address the issue.  
 
Resumen 
 
En este trabajo, se analiza la relación entre el ciclo económico y los excedentes de capital 
sobre requerimientos de recursos propios de bancos y cajas en España. A partir de un 
panel de datos individuales para el período 1986-2000 (que cubre un ciclo completo), se 
estima una ecuación para el comportamiento del capital excedentario, que incluye entre los 
regresores un indicador de posición cíclica. Los resultados del ejercicio son muy robustos y 
claros y muestran que, una vez que se controlan los efectos del resto de sus 
determinantes, los excesos de capital mantienen una relación negativa con la posición en 
el ciclo. En términos cuantitativos, un aumento de un punto porcentual en la tasa de 
crecimiento del PIB reduce el colchón de capital en un 17%. Esta relación es, además, 
asimétrica, siendo más acusada durante las fases  expansivas del ciclo. De acuerdo con 
estos resultados, el llamado problema de la prociclicidad de los requerimientos de capital 
debería ser tenido en cuenta en el diseño final de Basilea II, probablemente en el marco del 
segundo pilar de dicho acuerdo.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Efforts within the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to update the 1988 
Basel Accord have almost finalised a new accord on banks’ capital adequacy, which is 
already known as “Basel II”. There remain, however, some outstanding issues and 
details. Among these, that of “pro-cyclicality” has, perhaps, produced most debate in 
the literature1.  
 
The concept of pro-cyclicality, when applied to the new capital requirements, 
may in principle be a little confusing. As is well known, one of the primary aims of the 
new accord is to link capital requirements more closely to risks. Accordingly, in a 
downturn, for instance, when risks are more likely to materialise, capital requirements 
might increase. Thus, capital requirements and output growth will move in opposite 
directions. But if capital requirements increase, banks would have to reduce their loans 
and the subsequent credit squeeze would add to the downturn. Capital requirements 
are therefore said to be (likely to be) pro-cyclical because they might amplify the 
fluctuations of the business cycle.  
 
It has been also argued, however, that if internal risk management models take 
properly into account the way default probabilities change throughout the business 
cycle, the effects on credit –and therefore, on output– should not be overstated.  
 
While arguments highlighting or minimising the actual relevance of the pro-
cyclicality problem have proliferated, the related empirical evidence is scant. 
Admittedly, the empirical literature on the impact of capital requirements on bank 
behaviour is extensive, though mainly confined to the US case2. Papers have dealt with 
issues such as whether the introduction of minimum capital requirements leads banks 
to hold higher capital; the impact of capital requirements on risk-taking, 
competitiveness and a level playing field; and whether capital requirements create 
credit crunches affecting the real economy. Nevertheless, as far as we know, these 
papers have not analysed the cyclical behaviour of capital requirements, perhaps 
because the current Basel capital accord ties capital requirements less closely to 
banks' capital risk. 
 
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to provide some fresh 
empirical evidence which may prove useful in the debate about the pro-cyclicality of the 
new capital accord. In particular, we have noticed that most arguments in this debate 
relate to the cyclicality of the capital requirements, thus ignoring the fact that only a few 
banks hold just the required capital, while most keep capital buffers which, in some 
                                                           
1 See, among others, BCBS (2001), Borio et al (2001), Danielsson et al (2001), DNB (2001) and 
ECB (2001). 
2 See, for example, Berger and Udell (1994), Berger (1995), Furfine (2000) and Kwan and 
Eisenbeis (1997). Jackson et al (1999) offers a detailed review. 
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cases, are quite significant3. The behaviour of these buffers and, in particular, their 
relationship to the business cycle may thus be an important piece of information. A 
positive relationship would mean that banks rebuild their capital during upturns, which 
might be used to fulfil a likely increase in requirements during the next downturn. This 
might offset, at least partially, the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements under Basel II. 
A negative relationship, however, would have less encouraging implications in this 
respect. 
 
In this paper, we analyse the relationship between the Spanish business cycle 
and the capital buffers (current capital over the minimum capital requirements) held by 
Spanish commercial and savings banks. Using standard econometric panel data 
techniques, we build an incomplete panel of Spanish institutions from 1986 to 2000 –
thus covering a complete business cycle– and estimate an equation for the behaviour 
of capital buffers that includes an indicator of the business cycle.  
 
Admittedly, focusing on a single country might reduce the scope of our analysis. 
While data availability (in particular regarding individual capital requirements) prevents 
us from a more general approach, it is worth mentioning that the business cycle seems 
–at least during the period considered– to have been relatively pronounced in Spain, 
which might render this an interesting case study. Moreover, Spanish banks are highly 
competitive and efficient, which reduces the probability of idiosyncratic factors biasing 
the results (see, for instance, ECB, 1999).  
 
Our findings are fairly robust and quite unequivocal. After controlling for other 
potential determinants of the surplus capital (cost of capital, risk profile of the 
institution, size…) we find a (robustly significant) negative relationship between the 
business cycle and the capital buffers that Spanish institutions held throughout the 
period analysed. This relationship is, moreover, asymmetric, being closer during 
upturns than during downturns. From a quantitative standpoint, an increase of 1 
percentage point in GDP growth might reduce capital buffers by 17%.  
 
According to our results, there is a strong case for seriously taking into account 
the so-called pro-cyclicality problem in the final design of Basel II. As one of the main 
objectives of the new accord is to link more directly capital requirements to actual risks, 
which are cyclical, Pillar 2 seems to be the right place to address the issue.  
 
It should be noted, finally, that our results relate to the behaviour of banks under 
Basel I. Of course, it cannot be totally ruled out that Basel II may cause a structural 
change. It is worth noting, however, that Basel II is going to change a quantitative 
requirement which, for most banks, is not strictly binding. Moreover, on average, capital 
requirements are not going to be increased. It is therefore an open question whether 
such a change has necessarily to affect the behaviour of capital buffers. In any event, it 
                                                           
3  Papers have usually focused on the determinants of the capital ratio or its rate of growth. See 
the references in Jackson et al (1999). 
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goes without saying that the policy implications of our results should be viewed with 
due caution.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The theoretical framework as well 
as the empirical equation we estimate are introduced in section 2, while the data set is 
described in section 3. The fourth section shows the main results of the basic 
econometric analysis, and some extensions are considered in section 5, providing 
more information on the pro-cyclicality of capital buffers. Finally, the conclusions of the 
paper are drawn in the last section. 
 
2. The theoretical framework and the empirical equation 
 
 As explained in the introduction, our contribution to the debate on the pro-
cyclicality issue is of an empirical nature. In particular, our main objective is to estimate 
how capital buffers react to changes in the cyclical position. To consistently estimate 
such a response, however, we have to take into account the effects of other potential 
determinants of capital excess, which might have a cyclical behaviour. Yet as 
commented above, there is as far as we know no model for capital buffer behaviour in 
the literature. To circumvent this problem, we build a stylised model aimed at providing 
the basis for an empirical equation for capital buffers.  
 
We start with a simple equation, which is fairly standard in the literature on real 
investment (see, for instance Blanchard and Fisher, 1989), describing the dynamics for 
the capital stock of a representative single bank 
 
ttt IKK += −1                                                                (1) 
 
where tK stands for the capital level at the end of period t, and tI  stands for the stock 
issues or repurchases (with a negative sign), plus retained profits during period t. While 
stock issues or repurchases can be decided in advance, retained profits are unknown 
at the beginning of each period and therefore the capital level is not known until the 
end of such a period.  
 
The reasons why banks may wish to hold capital are manifold (see, for 
instance, Berger et al., 1995). But as in Froot and Stein (1998) or Estrella (2001), we 
model the decisions a bank makes on capital as the result of a trade-off among three 
different types of costs related to capital levels.  
 
Firstly, holding capital has a direct cost for banks, as it has to be remunerated. 
In a context of asymmetric information, capital may even be more costly than 
alternative bank liabilities such as deposits or debt, as argued, for instance, in 
Campbell (1979) or Myers and Majluf (1984).  
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Secondly, holding capital reduces the probability of bankruptcy and therefore 
the so-called costs of failure, which include the loss of charter value, reputational loss 
and legal costs of the bankruptcy process (see, for instance, Acharya, 1996). Related 
to these costs are those associated with the existence of compulsory capital 
requirements. Higher capital levels also reduce the probability of not complying with 
those requirements, thus minimising the consequent costs. It is worth noting that 
including capital requirements in this way (i.e. as an additional cost of -not having 
enough- capital instead of in the form of a constraint) is not only useful for modelling 
purposes but also consistent with the way they actually operate. As a matter of fact, 
before regulatory limits are reached, supervisory authorities usually place some 
restrictions on the activity of the bank. 
 
Finally, as in the literature on real investment, we also assume that changing 
the capital level entails adjustment costs. The reasons why these costs emerge in this 
case are, however, different. Apart from pure transaction costs, the main adjustment 
costs included those related to the problem of asymmetric information in capital 
markets. As the issuer has an informational advantage over the potential buyers, 
issuing (repurchasing) stocks may be seen by the latter as a signal that the company 
considers that market prices are above (below) the true share value, which would 
increase the cost of the desired adjustment (see, for instance, Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Winter, 1994; or McNally, 1999). 
 
Under the simplest possible approach, all these costs might be gathered in the 
following equation  
 
( ) 2)2/1( tttttt IKC δγα +−=                                                 (2) 
 
where tα  represents the cost of remunerating the capital, tγ  represents the costs of 
failure (and/or the penalties for not complying with the regulatory minimum), and tδ  
reflects the existence of adjustment costs. Both linearity (regarding the first two groups 
of costs) and symmetry (in connection with adjustment costs) are assumed for the sake 
of simplicity. 
 
In this setting, the representative single bank minimises its intertemporal costs 
by solving the following problem 
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where the FOC regarding tC  can be written as follows 
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The regulatory minimum capital may now be subtracted from both sides and the 
expected capital replaced by the observed capital plus an expectation error to obtain 
 
( ) ( ) t
i
it
i
t
t
t
i
it
i
t
ttt EEEKKKK εαβδγβδ +



−



+−=− ∑∑ ∞
=
+
∞
=
+−
00
1
11
             (8) 
 
 
Accordingly, to consistently estimate the effects of the position in the cycle on the 
capital buffer we have to control for the effects of -i.e. to include in the RHS of our 
empirical equation- i) the first lag of the dependent variable, which captures the 
relevance of adjusting costs and should therefore have a positive sign; ii) variables 
related to the (expected) costs of remunerating capital, which should have a negative 
sign; and iii) variables capturing the (expected) bank failure costs for the bank, which 
are linked both to the bank’s attitude towards risk (see, for instance, Keeley, 1990 or 
Salas and Saurina, 2002a) and to the bank’s size, as suggested, for instance, by the 
well-known too-big-to-fail hypothesis. 
 
Looking for the precise variables that best proxy the conceptual ones derived 
above is an empirical question firmly in line with the nature of this paper. The strategy 
we have followed is to start with a basic equation built on the basis of the most obvious 
proxies for γα ,   andδ  and then expand it in several ways to test the robustness of 
the results. 
 
In particular, our starting point is the following equation for the capital buffer 
kept by institution i in period t (BUFit) 
  
TtbanksofnumberNi
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where we first include the endogenous variable with a one-period lag –the expected 
sign being positive– to test whether adjusting costs are relevant. Direct costs of 
remunerating the excess capital are approximated by each institution’s ROE (return on 
equity). The expected sign for this variable is thus negative. The risk profile of each 
institution is proxied by NPL, which measures the non-performing loans ratio (ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans and credits). This is an ex post measurement of the 
risks assumed by the institution and, therefore, its expected sign is negative. In 
addition, there might be an idiosyncratic time-invariant component in the bank’s risk 
profile, which would be captured, however, by iη . 
 
BIG and SMA are included to detect differences in the buffer according to the 
size of each institution. In particular, BIG (SMA) is a dummy variable taking value 1 for 
banks in the highest (lowest) decile. As commented above, big banks might be thought 
to keep relatively lower buffers as according to the “too-big-to-fail" hypothesis they 
believe that in the event of difficulties they will receive support from the regulator.4  
 
After including the determinants of the capital buffer suggested by the model, 
GDP growth (GDPG) is added in order to determine whether the business cycle has an 
additional effect on the capital buffer held by institutions. The significance, sign and 
magnitude of 5β  will allow us to answer the main questions that are the core of this 
paper. 
 
Finally, ηi is an unobservable variable aimed at capturing all idiosyncratic 
features of banks that are constant over time but vary from institution to institution –for 
example, the greater or lesser risk aversion of bank managers commented above– and 
εit is a standard random shock. 
 
We then try different extensions of (9), which are explained in more detail in 
Sections 4 and 5. Beforehand, however, it is worth commenting briefly on our data set. 
 
3. The data set 
 
Our data are drawn from the financial statements regularly and obligatorily sent 
by institutions to the Banco de España.  Consolidated figures have been used (except, 
of course, for institutions that do not consolidate their data and do not belong to a 
consolidable group), as capital requirements are imposed at the consolidated group 
level. The scope of the risks contained in consolidated balance sheets is, moreover, 
broader, as information about Spanish banking subsidiaries operating outside Spain is 
included.  
                                                           
4 Small banks, on the contrary, might have to hold relatively larger buffers if they face more 
difficulties tapping capital markets. Under this view, SMA might be seen as a proxy for δ  rather 
than for γ . 
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The way we measure the capital buffer merits some additional comments. In 
this respect, it is worth briefly reviewing the most significant regulatory changes to the 
Spanish capital adequacy ratio since 1985. That year saw the introduction in Spain of a 
capital adequacy ratio replacing the previous legally required ratio (equity/liabilities), 
whose usefulness was more than questionable. The 1985 capital adequacy ratio was 
calculated as the higher of a gearing ratio (equity/total assets) of 5% and a risk asset 
ratio under which a different level of capital was required (from 0.25% to 35%), 
depending on the risk associated with the different headings. 
 
In 1993 the Spanish regulation was adapted to the Community directive which, 
broadly speaking, adhered to the 1988 Basel capital accord. The regulation has not 
changed fundamentally since, and it is based on the definition of the components of the 
numerator and denominator of the capital adequacy ratio, namely capital and risk-
weighted assets. Capital should cover at least 8% of requirements. The new 1993 
regulatory framework prompted something of a decline in capital requirements, with a 
subsequent increase in the capital buffer given that the new regulation was less 
demanding than the 1985 regulation5. 
 
In the light of the regulation in place before 1993, BUF has been defined as the 
institution's capital less the requirements to which it was subject, divided by the 
requirements, thus circumventing the drawback whereby, before 1993, there was no 
minimum ratio applied across the board to all institutions. 
 
From among all credit institutions a sub-set has been selected made up of 
domestic institutions (including foreign institutions' subsidiaries operating in Spain) and 
savings banks. Foreign bank branches and credit co-operatives whose relative 
significance (in terms of business volume) is scant have been excluded. 
 
The data are annual and span the period from 1986 to 2000. In this manner a 
full business cycle of the Spanish economy is included, a point of particular importance 
given that the aim of this paper is, as mentioned, to analyse whether there is a 
relationship between the business cycle and the capital buffer held by institutions. 
 
Our panel is incomplete since new institutions have started to operate during 
the period considered while others have ceased to exist. Moreover, the impact of bank 
mergers during the period has also to be taken into account. Mergers pose an obstacle 
to calculating averages and, particularly, growth rates. To overcome this drawback so 
that the least number of observations possible is lost, it has been decided to artificially 
re-create the merger a period in advance. That is to say, if two banking institutions 
merge at t, for the purposes solely of calculating averages and growth rates, the 
                                                           
5 Nonetheless, the Spanish 1993 regulation continues to be more demanding than that currently 
in force in Basel due mainly to the fact that recognition of unrealised capital gains is not 
permitted and general and statistical provisions are not considered as Tier 2 capital. 
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resulting institution is considered to have already existed at t-1, reconstructing it on the 
basis of the data from the individual institutions involved in the merger.  
 
A similar problem arises for institutions which, having belonged at t-1 to a 
consolidated group, leave such group at t. To calculate both the averages of certain 
variables and their growth rates, the figure at t-1 is obtained from their individually 
reported financial statements. 
 
Under these premises and after eliminating a series of institutions with 
extremely atypical data (due essentially to the specific nature of their business), an 
incomplete panel has been obtained comprising up to 142 institutions over a period of 
up to 15 years, totalling 1309 observations.  
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of different variables, while Chart 1 plots 
the aggregate course of the aggregated capital buffer. 
 
[Table 1] 
[Chart 1] 
 
4.  Econometric results 
 
First of all, it is worth noting that variables in the empirical equation (9) are 
defined in levels, while some (such as NPL) are likely to be correlated with ηi.  As usual 
in panel data analysis, we proceed to transform (9) into first differences, to enable 
unbiased estimates to be obtained. Further, as the lagged endogenous variable is 
included among the regressors and other explanatory variables are likely to be 
endogenous, an estimation procedure based on the generalised method of moments 
(GMM) seems the most appropriate6. In particular, the instruments chosen for the 
lagged endogenous variable NPL and ROE, are two-to-four-period lags of the same 
variables. These lags have been chosen to avoid correlation with the error term εit 
(which now appears in first differences) while minimising, at the same time, the number 
of observations lost. The variables of size and business cycle are considered to be 
exogenous and therefore used as their own instruments.  
 
Table 2, column 1, shows the main results of the estimation of equation (9). 
Regarding the significance and sign of the coefficient of output growth, we find that, 
after controlling for other determinants, there is a clearly significant (at 1%) negative 
relationship between the capital buffer and the phase of the cycle. Accordingly, in the 
case of Spain, capital requirements barely sensitive to the cycle (i.e. the 1988 Basle 
Accord) have translated into relatively pro-cyclical buffers. 
 
                                                           
6 We have used the DPD package (Arellano and Bond (1991 and 1988)), the GMM estimator of 
which is specially designed to obtain unbiased and efficient estimates in dynamic models with 
lagged endogenous variables as regressors. 
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[Table 2] 
 
The long-term semi-elasticity of the buffer relative to GDP growth, calculated at 
the sample buffer average, is 0.17. That is, an increase of 1 percentage point in GDP 
growth reduces the long-term relative buffer by around 17%. Given that the average 
sample of the relative buffer has, in the sample considered, been around 40% (in 
recent years, however, it is around 25%), and given also the usual magnitude of the 
changes in the rate of growth of GDP, the impact of the cycle, despite being very 
significant, seems to be moderate in quantitative terms.  
 
The remaining parameter estimates also provide some interesting results. Thus, 
some relevant persistence in the capital buffer is detected, which, as expected, reveals 
the existence of non-negligible short-term adjustment costs. The capital cost has, as 
might be expected, a significant negative effect on the surplus capital that the 
institutions wish to maintain. Moreover, banks that according to the proxy chosen have 
a more conservative profile tend to hold higher buffers to meet potential adverse 
shocks7. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) also find that the default ratio and the capital ratio 
are negatively related. And finally, the signs of the dummy variables BIG and SMA are, 
respectively, consistent with the too-big-to-fail hypothesis and the relatively greater 
difficulties for small banks to draw on capital markets. Nevertheless, both variables are 
only marginally significant (the p-values of the corresponding tests being 0.15 and 
0.12). 
 
The estimated equation, on the other hand, passes without any major problem 
the standard goodness-of-fit tests. All variables have, as commented, the expected 
sign and most of them are significant even at 1%, and there is significant negative first-
order autocorrelation in the residuals (m1 statistic) and nil second-order correlation 
(m2), as should be the case if the error term (in levels) is white noise. The Sargan test 
for validity of the instruments used is also fully satisfactory, showing a p-value of 0.26. 
 
As commented in section 2, our next step is to test the robustness of these 
results by trying different extensions of equation (9). To start with, we have extended 
equation (9) to include variables capturing the specific composition of banks’ balance 
sheets. There are several reasons why such variables might help to explain capital 
buffers. Thus, Basel I requires different capital ratios depending on the type of 
exposure. In the same vein, banks themselves might vary their buffers depending on 
the risk profile of their different portfolios. In particular, we have added three new 
regressors to equation (9), namely the weight in terms of total assets of i) loans 
(LOTA), ii) stocks (STTA), and iii) sovereign (SOTA).  
 
                                                           
7 As, for instance, in Wall and Peterson (1995), unexpected shocks might be approximated by 
means of the standard deviation of the rate of return in previous periods. Yet a standard 
deviation calculated on the basis of a few observations may not be very significant. For us it has 
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The second column in Table 2 shows the results of this modified version of our 
basic equation. Two main results emerge. First and more importantly, the estimated 
parameter for GDPG remains almost unchanged, thus supporting the robustness of the 
results in the first column of Table 1. And second, the new regressors are not 
significant, except for the last one. Significantly, their estimated signs are the expected 
ones should these variables reflect the risk profile of the bank (i.e. more loans, more 
stocks and less sovereign exposure are likely to reflect a riskier profile). This might 
explain why they are not significant in an equation that already includes NPL and a 
fixed effect.8 
 
The next extension we have tried has to do with the possibility that the pro-
cyclical behaviour of capital buffers we find is biased as result of the lack of control for 
other macroeconomic variables. To be relevant, those cyclical macroeconomic 
variables must affect loan demand –which certainly is clearly pro-cyclical. We have 
therefore included loan growth (LOANG) as an additional regressor in equation (9). It is 
worth noting that there might be another “technical” reason for including LOANG. Thus, 
an increase in loans implies an increase in capital requirements, which, in a context 
where adjusting capital is costly, is likely to transitorily reduce capital buffers.  
 
The third column of Table 2 shows the results of including loan growth (LOANG) 
in the regression. The new variable is significant at the 1% level and, as expected, its 
sign is negative –a contemporaneous increase in loan demand erodes the capital 
buffer. More importantly, however, the pro-cyclicality of the capital buffer remains 
almost unchanged, as well as the sign and significance of the other variables. 
 
Similarly, we have also tested whether our results might be influenced by the 
fact that the non-performing loans ratio is a markedly cyclical variable. Arguably, 
because of its cyclical behaviour, this variable could influence the sign and significance 
of GDP growth. The fourth column of Table 2 shows that if non-performing loans are 
excluded, GDP growth is still significantly negative. The change (i.e. bias) in the point 
estimate of the parameter of GDPG reveals, as expected under the null, that a relevant 
variable has now been omitted from the equation. 
 
Finally, we have also considered the possibility that capital buffers are 
maintained not only to withstand contemporary unexpected shocks but also to cover 
problem loans in future periods. A simple way of controlling for these effects is to use 
future values of such variable as instruments. The last column in Table 2 shows that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the additional disadvantage that it involves losing the first years of information, substantially 
reducing the sample size. 
8 Nothing changes if each individual variable –or pair– is considered in turn. We have also 
tested another potentially relevant balance sheet item (interbank exposures) and obtained the 
same results. 
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the main results in column 1 are not altered (either as regards their sign or significance) 
when future values of non-performing loans ratios are used as instruments.9 
 
All in all, we can conclude from Table 2 that the capital buffer held by Spanish 
institutions has behaved pro-cyclically over the last 15 years. Also, the capital buffer is 
found to depend, fairly robustly, on the risk profile of the institution, the cost of holding 
such a surplus and, to a lesser extent, the institution’s size.  
 
5. Capital buffer cyclicality: some additional results 
 
 After testing the robustness of the results, in this section we include some 
additional extensions that provide some further evidence related to the capital buffer 
pro-cyclicality found in the previous section. Table 3 summarises our main findings. 
 
[Table 3]  
 
First, we have used a different measure of the business cycle, which takes into 
account the possibility of non-constant potential output growth. The first column in 
Table 3 shows that the pro-cyclicality remains if GDP growth is replaced with the output 
gap (OUTGAP), obtained after applying a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter. The long-
term semi-elasticity falls somewhat (12%) while the other properties of the model 
remain unchanged.  
 
Next, we also investigated whether the pro-cyclicality of capital buffers could 
depend on specific features of the banks. In this respect, we first tried banks’ size, 
interacting GDPG and the dummy variables BIG and SMALL. As can be seen in the 
second column in Table 3, we did not find any meaningful difference in the behaviour of 
big or small banks. 
 
Another interesting feature that might affect the cyclicality of capital buffers is 
the ownership structure of the different institutions. In particular, the sample analysed in 
this paper is made up of commercial and savings banks. The former are all in the 
hands of private shareholders (concentrated to a greater or lesser degree depending 
on each bank) while the the governance of savings banks is shared among 
representatives of several stakeholder groups, public authorities (from local and regional 
government), the founding entity, depositors and workers. There is extensive empirical 
                                                           
9 We also performed other robustness tests that are not reported here for the sake of 
conciseness. It might be worth mentioning, however, that we introduced dummy variables to 
control for the regulatory change that occurred in 1993, without finding any significant effect on 
the conclusions drawn from the first column in Table 2.  
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literature on the impact that different ownership structures and distinct corporate 
governance arrangements may have on the risk profile of institutions10.  
 
We have, therefore, interacted GDP growth and a dummy variable (COM) 
taking a value equal to one when the institution is a commercial bank and to zero 
otherwise (i.e. when it is a savings bank). As shown in the third column of Table 3, this 
variable is only marginally significant, although it has a positive sign, meaning that 
capital buffers in commercial banks are, if anything, less pro-cyclical than in savings 
banks. The remaining properties of the model are not affected in any meaningful way. 
 
Finally, we have tested whether the pro-cyclicality we have found is symmetric, 
i.e. whether it operates in the same way during upturns and downturns. In particular, 
we have added a new variable to the right-hand side of equation (9): the absolute value 
of the difference between the output growth and the average output growth in the 
sample. As shown in the last column in Table 3, this variable is negative and 
statistically significant (even at 1%). Accordingly, when output growth is above its 
average, buffers diminish proportionally more than they increase when growth is below 
its average. The long-term semi-elasticity during upturns increases to 29%, standing at 
12% during downturns. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 The design of a new capital accord (Basel II) has prompted an interesting 
debate among regulators, supervisors, academics and practitioners. The issue of the 
potential pro-cyclicality of the new capital requirements is currently playing an important 
role in the debate.  
 
While most arguments about the cyclicality of the new agreement are of a 
purely theoretical nature and are centred on the capital requirements themselves, this 
paper aims to provide some empirical evidence and focus on the behaviour of the 
capital buffers that most banks hold above the minimum required by domestic 
regulations. The cyclicality of these buffers might offset or add to the potential 
cyclicality of the requirements. 
 
Using annual data on Spanish banks from 1986 to 2000, we have built an 
incomplete panel of 1309 observations and estimated an empirical equation to explain 
how capital buffers have behaved in that period. After controlling for other potential 
determinants of the excess of capital –cost of capital, risk profile of the bank, 
adjustment costs, size and unobservable idiosyncratic features– we have found a fairly 
robust and significant negative relationship between the capital buffers and the 
business cycle. In quantitative terms, the pro-cyclicality effect is moderate: an increase 
of 1 percentage point in GDP growth might reduce the buffer by 17%. This is likely to 
                                                           
10  See, for example, Esty (1997), Gorton and Rosen (1995), Saunders et al (1990) or, 
regarding the Spanish case, Salas and Saurina (2002b). 
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explain why, despite the markedly cyclical behaviour of capital buffers, banks have 
managed to keep fairly safe levels of capital even at the depths of recessions. 
 
Our results are obtained under the capital accord still in place (Basel I) and, 
therefore, the conclusions to be drawn regarding Basel II should be taken with due 
caution. It is still an open question, though, whether the new accord has necessarily to 
change the behaviour of banks regarding the buffers they maintain over requirements 
which, on average, are not going to be increased. According to our findings, the issue 
of pro-cyclicality seems to merit serious attention in the final design of Basel II. It is 
worth noting that this problem is difficult to address under Pillar 1 without being to the 
detriment of the objective of more directly linking capital requirements to actual risks.  
Pillar 2 might thus be a most suitable tool for dealing with this issue. In particular, a 
closer monitoring of the behaviour of banks’ own resources during the expansionary 
stages of the business cycle would appear to be justified in order to prevent potential 
negative effects on solvency should a sudden cyclical correction occur. 
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 Table 1. Summary statistics 
Sample period: 1986-2000 (annual data) 
Sample size: 1309 observations 
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Variable 
deviation 
BUF 40.29 40.44 -76.60 240.10 
ROE 15.28 10.62 -75.77 57.08 
NPL 4.55 3.26 0.00 27.34 
LOANG 16.27 16.22 -65.16 190.03 
SOTA 12.18 7.86 0.00 48.65 
LOTA 49.12 11.11 10.92 98.71 
STTA 1.64 1.82 0.00 18.98 
GDPG 3.27 1.70 -1.03 5.55 
OUTGAP 0.14 1.36 -1.82 2.16 
Notes: 
- Variables are defined in the main text 
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Table 2. Estimation of equation (9) 
Dependent variable: BUF  i, t 
Sample period: 1988-2000 (1029 observations) 
Estimation method: GMM, equation in first differences 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Explanatory 
variable 
BUF  i,t-1 .40 (.00) .27 (.00) .37 (.00) .42 (.00) .43 (.00) 
ROE  i,t -.43 (.01) -.41 (.02) -.35 (.03) -.51 (.00) -.39 (.01) 
NPL  i,t -1.99 (.00) -3.82 (.00) -2.31 (.00) -- -2.51 (.00) 
BIG  i,t -14.06 (.15) -24.57 (.03) -11.62 (.24) -13.71 (.13) -15.97 (.11)
SMA  i,t 21.74 (.12) 24.09 (.05) 15.12 (.19) 19.64 (.17) 18.20 (.17) 
GDPG  t -4.09 (.00) -4.03 (.00) -3.86 (.00) -2.14 (.00) -4.76 (.00) 
LOTA  it -- -.55 (.11) -- -- -- 
STTA  it -- -3.53 (0.35) -- -- -- 
SOTA  it -- .54 (.05) -- -- -- 
LOANG  it -- -- -.22 (.01) -- -- 
m1 -4.65 (.00) -4.24 (.00) -4.68 (.00) -4.52 (.00) -4.55 (.00) 
m2 .16 (.87) .28 (.78) .57 (.58) .23 (.82) .14 (.89) 
Sargan test 114.15 (.26) 120.25 (.48) 125.33 (.31) 105.55 (.13) 116.21 (.35) 
Notes: 
- See the main text for the definition of the variables 
- p-values in brackets 
- m1 and m2 stand for first - and second - order residual autocorrelation 
   tests 
- In all models, BIG, SMA and GDPG are considered as exogenous 
- Instruments for the endogenous variables: lags 2 to 4 in model 
   1, lags 2 to 3 for BUF, NPL, ROE and LOTA and lag 2  for SOTA and 
    STTA in model 2, lags 2 to 4 for BUF and NPL and 2 to 3 for ROE  
   and LOANG in model 3, lags 2 to 5 in model 4 and leads 1 to 4 for NPL  
   and lags 2 to 4 for BUF and  ROE in model 5, as selected in DPD  
   (Arellano & Bond, 1991) 
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Table 3. Extensions of equation (9) 
Dependent variable:  BUF i,t 
Sample period: 1988-2000 (1029 observations) 
Estimation method: GMM, equation in first differences 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Explanatory 
variable 
BUF i,t-1    .30 (.00)    .40 (.00)    .41 (.00)    .39 (.00) 
ROE i,t   -.56 (.00)   -.44 (.01)   -.43 (.01)   -.32 (.04) 
NPL i,t -.91 (.04) -2.04 (.00) -1.96 (.00) -2.04 (.00) 
BIG i,t -15.75 (.07) -7.36 (.40) -13.17 (.18) -13.04 (.17) 
SMA i,t 24.84 (.07) 12.21 (.45) 22.16 (.11) 21.77 (.11) 
GDPG t -- -4.18 (.00) -4.78 (.00) -4.99 (.00) 
OUTGAP t -3.27 (.00) -- -- -- 
BIG i,t *GDPG t -- -2.40 (.28) -- -- 
SMA i,t *GDPG t -- 2.82 (.14) -- -- 
COM i,t *GDPG t -- -- 2.21 (.11) 
|GDPG| t -- -- -- -2.08 (.00) 
m1 -4.58 (.00) -4.63 (.00) -4.57 (.00) -4.69 (.00) 
m2 .15 (.88) .17 (.87) .23 (.82) .13 (.90) 
Sargan test 116.83 (.20) 114.43 (.25) 112.02 (.30) 114.12 (.26) 
Notes: 
- See the main text for the definition of the variables 
- p-values in brackets 
- m1 and m2 stand for first- and second-order residual autocorrelation 
     tests 
- BIG, SMA, GDPG, OUTGAP and COM are considered as exogenous 
- Instruments for the endogenous variables: lags 2 to 4 in models as selected 
     in DPD (Arellano & Bond, 1991). 
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Chart 1. Capital buffer in relative terms (current capital less capital requirements over capital 
requirements): 1988-2000. Percentage points. 
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